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THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CLASS UNDER SOCIALISM

SHARON ZUKIN

Posing the problem of social class under socialism implies that the concept of class can be removed from the historical context of capitalist society and applied to societies which either do not know or do not claim to know the classical capitalist mode of production. Over the past fifty years, the obstacles to such an analysis have often led to political recriminations and terminological culs-de-sac. Most recent serious scholars of socialist society have treaded the empirical waters of social stratification without ever reaching the farther shore of theory, while others have recast the flotsam and jetsam of social differentiation into unwieldy, even meaningless, "principles."[1] They also fall short of a theoretical understanding, first, of what causes class relations in the socialist societies and, second, of whether these relations resemble those of capitalist societies. Perhaps the reason for this theoretical lack is that these analyses fail to confront three fundamental methodological issues: the concept of social class itself; the structural similarities between socialist and pre-capitalist, rather than socialist and capitalist, societies; and the admittedly tentative or transitory nature of socialist society.[2]

Because the concept of social class was elaborated with reference to capitalism, it is replete with connotations of capitalist social relations. Such connotations include the salience or determinance of a specific relation to the means of production, the varieties of alienation which are engendered by that relation, and the central presence of a "classical" bourgeoisie whose hegemony is primarily based on economic constraints. Despite this anchoring in capitalist social relations, the concept of class has permitted considerable looseness – even within the work of Marx – in analyzing social class in capitalist society.[3] But most attempts to ferret out classes in socialist society show even more conceptual laxity. Such discussions extrapolate class from its structural matrix and thus deprive the concept of the analytic force that it derives from

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the Marxist paradigm. Furthermore, by reconceptualizing "capital" in terms of non-economic relations, such as those based on knowledge, skills, and access to key institutions; by sketching "ownership" and "alienation" in broad terms of control and lack of democracy; and also by recasting the Party-state bureaucracy in the role of the classical bourgeoisie, these analyses force a functionalist convergence between conceptions of capitalist and socialist society.

Both Marxists who castigate state-capitalism and non-Marxists who assume the inescapability of capitalist-like class relations have reached this judgment. While they differ methodologically, their conclusions share a fundamental pessimism about the future of socialist society. Thus, in both Marxist and non-Marxist analyses, social class appears as one of those concepts which resonate with "metaphysical pathos," condemning to fatalism all who apply it to socialist society.[4]

Nevertheless, the concept of social class can be extended to non-capitalist societies in such a way as to traduce neither the differences between them and capitalist society nor the critical, structural context of class relations. In other words, it should be possible to make a Marxist analysis of social class under socialism by admitting the existence of class relations and examining the structural conditions of class struggle, without also assuming that either the relations or the expression of struggle represents a variety of capitalism. Some recent anthropological work on early pre-capitalist societies offers a suggestive, albeit incomplete, model. Generally using a Marxist framework, these anthropologists have re-interpreted pre-capitalist societies, once described as classless or as the province of tribal or status groups, as class societies.[5]

For at least two reasons, this anthropological reinterpretation encourages analysis of social class under socialism. First, in answer to the problem noted above, such an analysis need not imply that socialist society reproduces the social relations of capitalism. Second, the anthropologists' work enables us to treat the development of class relations under socialism in terms of a pre-capitalist, rather than a capitalist or a quasi-capitalist, nexus. Given the location of the revolutionary socialist societies on the periphery of the capitalist world system, it makes sense to emphasize the structural similarities between socialist and early pre-capitalist society.[6] These structural similarities include the absence of private property; a politically organized redistribution of the surplus; the priority of political and ideological over economic relations; a functional elite which may develop into a social class; the parallel existence of various means of exchange which have not been superseded by a single, uniform market; and, finally, the incomplete or partial nature of social classes,

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in contrast to capitalist social classes, which makes judgments about the class nature of both socialist and pre-capitalist society so problematic.[7]

The question of a transition period to or through socialism represents a final obstacle to analyzing social relations in socialist society. This problem presents us with a series of questions, concerning the relation between a projected social *telos* and contemporary practice, the elements in the transitional structure which will tend to have lasting significance, and the difference between a transition period and a *bona fide* mode of production. In other words, analyzing class relations under socialism in a particular period seems to demand that we resolve here and now the continuing contradictions of socialist society. Timing causes a further analytic difficulty, too, for socialist society must be considered not only as a twentieth-century response to the capitalist world system but also as a social formation with its own trajectory. Thus a methodology for studying the problem of social class under socialism must combine both synchronic and diachronic analysis.[8]

The methodological issues that we have raised so far – the elasticity of the concept of social class, the structural similarities between socialist and early pre-capitalist society, and the problem of the transition period – have suggested several guidelines for the analysis of social class under socialism. First, if the concept of class can be extended to the analysis of non-capitalist, i.e. early pre-capitalist and socialist, societies, then it must depart from a definition which emphasizes the historical characteristics of social class in capitalist society. That is, the concept of class must move away from reliance on a straightforward criterion of "relation to the means of production" and toward an understanding of the role of extra-economic factors in creating and maintaining class relations. In extending the concept of class, we should be careful to avoid the assumption that "capital" is the element which reproduces class relations in all forms of society. Thus, we must reject all attempts to analyze class relations in socialist society by reconceptualizing capital in terms of knowledge, skills, access, and so on. Another conceptual fallacy which must be avoided is the *burgo-centric* emphasis on the centrality of a classical bourgeoisie, or its functional equivalent, to class relations. This fallacy has often led to attempts to identify the Party-state bureaucracy as a substitute for the classical bourgeoisie in socialist society. Avoiding this fallacy poses two precise tasks for a class analysis of socialist society: on the one hand, it requires explaining the real role of the Party-state bureaucracy in reproducing class relations; on the other hand, it requires outlining the whole set of class relations under socialism, in which the bureaucracy plays only a part.

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Furthermore, the significance of extra-economic factors in pre-capitalist and socialist society suggests that we focus attention on those contradictions in social relations which might mitigate the class nature of these relations as we know it in capitalist society. (Certainly there has been much discussion of those contradictions in socialist society which mystify the class nature of social relations.) Another consideration arises from the nature of social relations in the admitted transition period of socialist society. Whatever we call the mode of production which will issue from this transition period, we must frankly acknowledge the fluidity and the potentiality, rather than the conclusiveness, of the class relations that we find at this point in the development of socialist society. Finally, the similarities between socialist and early pre-capitalist society, as well as the location of the revolutionary socialist societies on the periphery of the world system, suggest that we keep in mind the structural congruence between societies of the Second and Third Worlds.

The Structural Framework

Even in a society which declares itself socialist, the source of class relations lies in the very structure of the society. This is not any structure or "structuration" of social class, itself but

> *the ensemble of the structures* of a mode of production and social formation, *and . . . the relations which are maintained there* by the different levels. Let us anticipate and say that everything happens as if social classes were the *result of an ensemble of structures and of their relations,* firstly at the economic level, secondly at the political level and thirdly at the ideological level.[9]

So far, however, the quest for the structure of socialist society has been as teleological, as eventful, and as inconclusive as Parsifal's. Two common types of explanation of the structure of socialist society emphasize, on the one hand, bureaucracy and, on the other hand, technocracy. Explanations which rely upon bureaucratic domination seem to imply a mode of production which differs from capitalism while it superficially resembles the political relations of a pre-capitalist form of society, say, the overworked concept of the Asiatic mode of production.[10] However, those explanations which stress technocratic predominance imply a mode of production similar to that of late capitalism, in which certain economic relations and their economistic culture dominate society. Neither of these explanations successfully pinpoints those structural elements of socialist society which engender class relations. One problem concerns periodicity, that is, the simultaneity or the succession of bureaucratic and technocratic predominance. Just as a technocratic explana-

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tion cannot be grafted onto a bureaucratic explanation, so too, no external factor (such as "modernization" or "industrialization") should be used to account mechanistically for a change from a bureaucratic to a technocratic social structure.

But what do such terms really mean? Social structure – whether capitalist or socialist – is far more complex than either bureaucratic or technocratic dominance implies. Therefore, an analysis of class in socialist society cannot be based on one factor only, e.g. bureaucracy or technocracy; it must document fully the conditions of class struggle on economic, political, and ideological levels. This requires a theory of the structure of socialist society, because it is only in the structure that we can locate class struggle – which is "composed of relations of opposition, i.e. of relations of contradiction in the simplest sense of the term."[11]

But there is a difference in the way that contradictions have generally been viewed in capitalist, as opposed to socialist or pre-capitalist, society. Contradictions in capitalist society are usually defined in terms of utility: that is, contradictions occur when interests are not translated into institutional behavior, the parts of the social machine do not mesh, and there is a danger that the machine will strip its gears. However, the analysis of contradictions in socialist society has usually dealt with ideological lapses, as though the corrosion of theory by practice were tantamount to social breakdown. Still, doubt persists about how to treat a society which sets out with an explicit theory rather than, or in addition to, the implicit ideology of practice. Thus, in contrast to the analysis of social class in capitalist society, the problem of class under socialism includes two sets of practice which must be examined: practice in relation to Marxist theory (or *praxis*) and practice in terms of the patterns of behavior which develop over time. As the socialist societies have discovered after passing through the first phase of confiscation of private property, theory has limited value in finding and rooting out the sources of social class which grow under socialism. For this task, *class practice,* rather than theory, must be considered.

Class practice represents a conceptual link between the underlying structure which determines all social relations and those contradictions which engender class relations. The concept also has the potential to express three important aspects of social class: first, that social classes are continually being constructed in ongoing social relations; second, that class relations may derive from the "superstructure" of politics, ideology, and culture, as well as from the economic "base" of the society; and, third, that through an interaction between the objective and the subjective aspects of social existence, the

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collectivities which co-exist in class relations create themselves. Thus, while we have taken the emphasis on class practice from Nicos Poulantzas' reading of Marx, we have instilled into the concept a reference to the human, historical subject of class relations – a reference which Poulantzas has rejected.[12] It is clear enough from the theoretical work of Poulantzas, as well as empirical studies such as E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, that "Social classes, although objectively determined (structures), are not ontological and nominalist entities, but only exist within and through the class struggle *(practices)*."[13] But the third aspect of our use of class practice, while implicit in historical studies of the *Making* . . . type, is emphasized theoretically by Sartre. As Mark Poster describes Sartre's contribution to the conceptualization of social class, "It was not enough to list external criteria like income, relation to the means of production, or status in order to constitute a historical class. A class was not a collection of things, but a human group that constituted itself, that actively organized itself into a commonality."[14]

If these aspects of social class can be combined in the concept of class practice, then we should have a potent tool for the analysis of class in socialist society. Such a discussion should turn on three basic terms: underlying structure of the society, class struggle or contradictions, and class practice. There seems to be a simple relationship between these terms, and between intellectual discussions of class and the experience of class as it affects all people: contradictions are determined by the underlying structure of socialist societies and are expressed in everyday life by the class practice which has developed there.

At which societies do we look, and at which underlying structure? The location of revolutionary socialist societies on the periphery of the world system suggests a basic similarity in their underlying structure. Whether this commonality obscures an eventual distinction between a socialist mode of production and the present socialist social formations cannot be answered now. However, we have witnessed enough socialist revolutions to be able to describe how they effect a structural transformation to a society based on performance rather than ownership, where criteria of contingency rather than absolute criteria determine status, and where there is public or social, rather than individual or corporate, accumulation of capital. The Soviet Union and China have so far represented two divergent structures within this general framework: the former, an industrial, anti-peasant society which seeks integration, albeit competitive integration, within the world economic system; the latter, an agrarian society which, until Mao's death, de-emphasized both industrialism and international economic integration – each country, in its way, intent on being a "core" of the socialist world. Between the socialist and

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the capitalist cores emerges the practice of the peripheral, though strategically important, societies of Eastern Europe, Cuba, Asia, and Africa. Their practice generally has a moral rather than a material influence on the development of what is considered typically socialist structure, which, as in any mode of production, is set in the core areas.[15] The development of a distinctive socialist structure is inhibited to the degree that the particular socialist society is integrated into international labor exchanges and financial agreements.[16]

Although socialist revolutions have eliminated whole institutions, such as the tsardom or the mandarinate, they can not build a socialist structure which would be autonomous from pre-revolutionary structure. On the one hand, there appear to be infrastructural constraints on the economic, social, and political choices that a revolutionary leadership can make, e.g. whether the new, "socialist" structure will be oriented toward cities or countryside, toward heavy industry or agriculture, toward maintaining or breaking an equilibrium between peasants, workers, and Party cadres.[17] On the other hand, there are unforeseen consequences which may follow either the adoption of institutional practices from other social contexts, or a change of place in the system of international domination, as shown by the Soviet adoption of a program of rapid, heavy industrialization and state planning after 1926, by Soviet foreign policy, and by Yugoslavia's efforts since 1965 to overcome the divisive effects of a modified market mechanism.[18] Of course, this does not imply that the structure of socialist society merely reproduces the society that it is intended to replace, or that it inevitably retraces the steps that other societies have taken.

Despite these difficulties, the terms which appear essential to an analysis of class in any form of society are the ***underlying structure,*** which shapes all social relations, the *contradictions* which engender class relations, and the *practice* which expresses, reflects, and reproduces class relations. Although it is somewhat artificial to separate the three terms, perhaps the discussion will be clearer if we turn first to the underlying structure of socialist society, then to class practice, and finally to contradictions which link structure and class practice.

Toward Underlying Structure

Perhaps the most significant change in social structure occurs during the period of enormous growth which follows the revolution and opens up, at least temporarily, class practices. Property is confiscated and socialized, new jobs are created, new people are recruited into these jobs, and new criteria

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emerge for their recruitment. Despite the recognition that a transition to socialism might take centuries, the first post-revolutionary generation represents a real transition from a partially capitalist structure to the social formation of socialism. In many ways this first generation shows the elasticity, the ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of socialist class relations. Certainly, the wholesale promotion of the post-revolutionary generation to positions of power, responsibility, and prestige fosters the impression that class structure under socialism is open, fluid, and continually expanding. However, in retrospect, as Barrington Moore, Jr., has pointed out in reference to the Soviet Union, "a very large proportion of the past opportunities for advancement resulted from non-repeating causes, such as the elimination of the former ruling classes and decimation of the professional and scientific personnel [and] the rapid industrialization of the country."[19]

The objective reasons for the closing of the class structure are closely related to the very reasons for its opening up in the post-revolutionary period: the combination of political dangers and political patronage which underlay the widespread promotions of the first few years. There has been a "Piotr principle" at work in socialist society, according to which political appointees are often pushed into jobs above their educational level, while technicians and specialists are frequently held in jobs below their educational level.[20] Moreover, the surplus population can only be absorbed into relatively unskilled jobs as a permanent "lower" class, The treatment of this group varies according to the economic geography of particular societies: Yugoslavia exports the surplus population which would be unemployed at home to Western Europe as "guest (i.e. migrant) workers." The Soviet Union can still settle virgin territories, as long as it will commit resources to subsidize the settlement. To the degree that the Soviets have not absorbed surplus population, as in Central Asia where fertility rates are high, a lower class of certain regions is maintained. The Chinese can continue to "send down" surplus urban population to rural communes and to transfer parts of the rural population.[21]

Although there are many examples of how upwardly mobile members of the first revolutionary generation have willingly assumed, with their new positions, a formality, a distance, and a set of perquisites which differentiate them from their former comrades and their kin,[22] three factors have intervened to prevent the creation of the differentiated, antithetical class practices typical of capitalist society: first, elements of the shared peasant culture of a majority of the population; second, the ideological dominance, at least in the early post-revolutionary period, of manual work and workers; and, third, the continued recruitment of peasant and recently-urbanized parts of the popula-

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tion into executive work in political organizations. Nevertheless, at this point socialist class structure has a built-in contradiction: ideology emphasizes manual work, but at the same time, the most promising manual workers are offered administrative positions, where work is politically and economically rewarding.[23]

The relation between political administrators and manual workers in socialist society recalls the relation between an elite such as the priesthood or the chieftainship and the population, or the hunters of the population, in early pre-capitalist forms of society. Like the priesthood or the chieftainship, the Party-state bureaucracy lacks the distinct and homogeneous practice, the class ideology, and the continuity which differentiate a class from a dominant functional group.[24] However, as in pre-capitalist society, the functional differentiation may presage a transition to a class society.[25] Insofar as the political administrators develop their own ideology, as distinct from a legitimating ideology, they aspire to the class practice which would be developed by a revolutionary proletariat – if there were one. The political administrators' ideology is based on voluntarism, asceticism, and egalitarianism, and it serves to bind together both political cadres and old-time, highly skilled manual workers in what appears, temporarily, to be a single, expanding "revolutionary" class. Indeed, in the early post-revolutionary period, this is the hegemonic class: as the highly-skilled workers, who are regarded as the true proletariat, are increasingly integrated with the cadres in the ranks of the Party-state bureaucracy. In the Soviet Union, this period ends in the early 1930s, when the pre-revolutionary group of highly-skilled workers have been incorporated into administrative strata and have been replaced on the factory floors by raw peasant recruits. In Yugoslavia, this period ends by the mid-1960s, with a similar constitution of the administrative strata and the emergence, again similar to Soviet experience, of a more cohesive bureaucracy and a more heterogeneous manual working class. The experience of China and Cuba suggests that a combination of democratically organized units at the "base" levels of society (as in committees and workers' councils) and continual mobilization of the population may stave off the end of the cadre-worker hegemony. Even so, to a great extent this hegemony lives on in ideological and economic relations, despite its contradiction by repressive political forces in the Party, the state, and the police organs.

To that extent the socialist societies share a common structure. They reach a watershed with the decision to push for maximum productivity, especially when this productivity is geared toward full industrialization. This decision is so momentous for the structure of the society that it almost appears to create a mode of production of its own.[26] Indeed, with its emphasis on productivity

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within an international exchange system, whose priority of capital-accumulation and capital-investment influences the establishment of new, collective rights over resources, socialist industrialization recalls the general process, though not, perhaps, the consequences, of the growth of early capitalism in Western Europe.[27] As early as 1920–21 in the Soviet Union, for example, measures of productivity as well as techniques of production were imported from the capitalist countries; wages were made to vary according to supply and demand; industrial designers were brought from the United States to plan factories; conferences and commissions were set up to study scientific management; and competition, like incentives, became compulsory.[28] The significance of these changes lies not so much in the introduction of differentials as in the conflict, reinforced in other areas of practice, between those who give and those who get incentives to produce. This conflict may become a contradiction when it is institutionalized on the ideological-political level, as with the establishment of the first Five Year Plan in the Soviet Union in 1928.[29] As Moore notes,

> While even the most theoretically inclined Bolsheviks were quick to realize the need for "proletarian labor discipline" after the November Revolution, they did not draw the implication that discipline reflects some form of conflict of interests between the discipliners and the disciplined.[30]

In contrast to Bolshevik "economism," current criticism of the Soviet and East European experiences with socialism suggests that a new, socialist mode of production would not supersede capitalism so much as it would avoid it. In this literature, what appears as a distinctly "socialist" mode of production is constructed on a peasant base; in that sense, socialist society carries out the agrarian revolution which did not occur under other, i.e. bourgeois or state, auspices.[31]

Although the decision to push toward heavy industrialization has, so far, changed the structure of the labor force and caused the introduction of certain norms and practices, which recall the results of industrialization in capitalist society, it is probably fallacious to assume that industrialization engenders the same class structure regardless of the capitalist or the socialist context.[32] By the same token, despite the obvious differences in class relations between the industrial socialist societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the agrarian socialist societies of China and Cuba – differences which it has become quite fashionable, at least in literary circles, to underline – some structural similarities persist. Perhaps the most general structural trend is the streamlining of the old class relations from both the pre-revolutionary era and the immediate post-revolutionary period. What the East

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European sociologists sanguinely described in the mid-1960s as a "leveling" or a "decomposition" of traditional social classes, turns out to have been a momentary view of the collapse of the first post-revolutionary class practice before the building up of a new structure.[33] In a sense other than the pseudo-egalitarianism that we can find in Eastern Europe, the first class structure does "collapse" because of decreased social distance and increased common interest between classes which had previously been distinct and even antithetical, but new classes are constructed on that basis. For example, practices differentiate a new lower class, forged of peasants, unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and routine clerical workers; and a new upper class is created in a symbiotic coalition between technocrats and bureaucrats. Several strata are left in relatively undefined or even contradictory class locations,[34] politically neutralized so that they cannot challenge the emerging structure, but unconnected – in terms of class practice – to the new upper and lower classes. These are the highly skilled workers, the higher white-collar workers, and the intellectuals.[35]

These groups recall parallels with classes in capitalist society, but their relations in socialist society are much more ambiguous. The technocrats and bureaucrats, for example, are linked in social networks and sometimes cross between organizational hierarchies, especially on the local level, but they constitute neither a ruling class nor a socialist bourgeoisie. Certainly they work in return for elitist rewards, but they have negligible amounts of capital at their personal disposal, and they do not exploit others in an unmediated relation for their own profit. Moreover, although they dominate the rest of society in many sorts of relations, the dominance of technocrats and the dominance of bureaucrats are based on different – in some views, competing – criteria. They seem to constitute a coalition more than a class, although the heterogeneous interests of this coalition may eventually develop into the greater homogeneity of a class, especially in cultural, political, and ideological characteristics.

The new lower class is also heterogeneous in its origins, its experience, and its work. However, its utilization in the lowest-paid jobs, its exploited position in relation to capital-accumulation, its social networks, and its closeness to agricultural work, disappearing small village landholdings, and rural culture suggest an approximation to the earlier proletariat of capitalist industrialization and the partial proletariat which exists today in Third World countries.[36] For the Bolsheviks in the 1920s, according to Bettelheim, this lowest stratum of inexperienced unskilled and young workers represented "a semi-proletariat," in contrast to the "real proletariat" of the highly skilled and senior workers. Because the former were "more or less 'casual workers,'

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manual workers recently arrived from the countryside, often destined to return there and remaining impregnated with the "peasant mentality," they were considered a politically negligible group by the Bolkshevik leaders, who defended, instead, the material interests (including the relatively high wages) of the highly skilled workers.[37]

In theory, however, the highly skilled workers in socialist society represent a stratum of this proletariat (as in "dictatorship of the proletariat"). In practice, these workers straddle the top of the lower class and the bottom of the upper class. Frequently they have antecedents in the pre-revolutionary working class and urban culture, so it is easy to see how they become an ideologically dominant group. Materially, too, their wages are higher than those of the less skilled manual workers and the lower white-collar workers.

The higher white-collar workers also have an ambiguous class location. Theoretically, they are merely a stratum of the socialist working class; in practice, they are related to the upper class; ideologically, they are ambivalent. Insofar as they are identified, as state employees, with the fortunes of the state bureaucracy, they may relate to an upper class; nevertheless, as wage-earners who are dependent on performance contingencies, they may relate to a lower class. The more they are involved with the dominant functional sectors of the society (which vary from society to society), the more they may adopt upper-class practices. Conversely, the more they are employed in routine jobs, particularly away from the largest cities, the less they may distinguish themselves from lower-class practice.[38] Certainly, some well-educated, higher white-collar workers aspire to an upper-class practice, and for that reason they respond favorably to recruitment into Party membership and bureaucratic or technocratic jobs. As Bettelheim describes the resulting "ambiguity" of the socialist intellectuals, at least as it appeared in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, "To the degree that that incorporation [into the socialist state, the socialist economy, and the Bolshevik Party] took place without the intelligentsia's ideological transformation and where the ideological apparatuses were not revolutionized, the overwhelming majority of its members acted as *agents of bourgeois practices.*"[39]

To some degree all three of these strata, both materially and ideologically, are in ambiguous or even contradictory class locations, vacillating between upper-class and lower-class practice. This situation makes for a partial autonomy from relations of domination and subordination as well as a particular vulnerability to manipulation into such relations. The upper and lower classes and the three strata seem to reproduce themselves through access – or lack of access – to the urban, administrative, hegemonic cul-

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ture.[40] However, the incomplete creation of social classes in classical relations of exploitation and domination suggests that the socialist societies have established a structure of "partial" classes and strata, in which ambiguities and contradictory practices are far more prevalent than in the class relations envisioned by either the convergence or the state capitalist model. This characteristic structure creates a basic understanding between countries of the Second and Third Worlds, which is not negated by relations or intentions of domination between them.

Class Practice

Although wage and status differentials do exist – sometimes to a surprising degree – in the socialist societies, and therefore constitute *prima facie* evidence of inequality, their relationship to class structure is complicated.[41] On the one hand, wage differentials may be quite random or they may be insignificantly small. On the other hand, as both leaders and students of socialist society have concluded, they may be objectively necessary in order to mobilize people to work.[42] But differentials do have structural significance when they reinforce or are reinforced by patterns of domination which frequently appear outside or external to the differentials themselves.

In Yugoslavia, for example, wage differentials are supposed to be pegged to productivity and skill, but in fact they are related more to the economic and ideological dominance of certain branches of the economy. In particular, the tertiary sector (and its employees on all skill levels) dominates all branches of industrial production. This contrasts with the Soviet Union, where, since NEP, heavy industry has been the predominant economic sector, and has been disproportionately rewarded as a result. As Yugoslav researcher Boris Vušković says,

> The fact that average basic earnings are highest in finance and administration is clearly nothing to do with the superior results of their labor. It is due to the fact that these are the key centers of economic and political power. Professional skill and the results of labor, though they continue to be relevant factors in internal distribution of income within single branches, have been rendered quite secondary factors . . .[43]

While wage differences within any one company in Yugoslavia generally vary in a ratio of 1:4, "the differences between the highest earnings in the leading branch and the lowest earnings in a branch at the bottom . . . [are] of the order of 1:15." Moreover, these disparities in basic wages are magnified by differential access (according to both economic sector and skill level) to

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"supplementary earnings," such as overtime and moonlighting pay, which are evidently increasing faster than basic salaries and wages.[44] Another external factor which establishes a relation between wage differentials and class structure is family size, relative to the number of working family members. Again according to Vušković, in Yugoslavia unskilled workers have the largest families which are supported by the fewest working members; in contrast, professionals have the smallest families with the greatest proportion of multiple wage-earners. As Vušković points out, the income of working wives establishes a distance between white-collar workers and highly skilled workers who, as individuals, earn comparable salaries. "The gap between skilled and semi-skilled workers, on the one hand, and all white-collar categories, on the other, becomes an unbridgeable gulf."[45] A third external factor which reinforces a relationship between wage differentials and class structure is the opportunity for "socialist entrepreneurialism" within the sector of public ownership. Investment leeway is provided under cover of public ownership through differential access to loans and mortgages, especially at favorable low rates; corrupt business practices; and collective capitalism on the part of enterprises. Even though individuals and enterprises enjoy more protection from competition than in capitalist society, the entrepreneurialism supported by this unofficial investment policy has an effect similar to capitalist concentration.

A fourth significant factor which affects class structure is the opportunity for segregating or isolating different groups of the population, particularly in urban housing. Even in state- or enterprise-owned apartment houses, professionals and highly-skilled workers receive the most, the best, and the roomiest places. When they receive subsidized housing loans, they frequently use them to build vacation houses. While it is true that the socialist societies do not spawn inner-city slums, the group that we have called the lower class inhabits smaller apartments in older buildings or builds small houses, often without legal permission, on the urban perimeter, sometimes in shantytowns. The Hungarian sociologist Ivan Szelenyi has traced two housing "careers" for upper and lower income groups. Members of the higher income group start out as roomers or remain in their parents' house; they then obtain apartments in the older state-owned buildings; and finally they either acquire apartments in the most desirable and newest state-owned buildings or invest in a cooperative apartment house with similar employees or professionals and their families. The lower income group shows a different housing pattern. The highest upward mobility in housing that they can generally expect is either a move into an older state-owned apartment which may have been vacated by a higher-income tenants (Szelenyi likens this to the "filtering down" effect in capitalist housing markets) or the construction of a small

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house at some distance from the center city.[46] Thus cooperative and public ownership of housing does not result in segregated neighborhoods – with the important exception or loophole of the illegal housing in the urban perimeter – but it does set the context of differential class practices in smaller housing units, that is, the buildings themselves.

A final factor which reinforces patterns of domination and subordination is the "overall decline of working-class presence," as Vušković puts it, in official organs of government, Party, and workers' self-management. While the over-representation of professionals, technicians, and highly-skilled workers, and the corresponding under-representation of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, is most important to a country with institutions of participatory democracy like Yugoslavia, this is a structural failing common to all the socialist societies. The administration of these countries has become the province of a professionalized white-collar and executive group, whose members leave non-administrative, i.e. manual, work very early in their careers (ironically, this is especially true in the Soviet Union for Party administrators). Indeed, a difference can be observed in Yugoslavia as early as secondary school, where at least three patterns develop in response to political activism. First, students from professional and managerial family backgrounds, or those who are studying in gymnasiums, feel at ease in institutions of political participation. Second, students from less skilled, lower income families, or those who are studying in trade schools, tend to withdraw from participatory institutions. A third pattern, not excluded by either of the others, is represented by opportunism: it is usually young people from the less skilled, lower income families, particularly from rural or recently urbanized milieux, who enhance their credentials through political activism, from membership in the youth league or communist party to eventual official positions.[47] Thus factors which are external to wage and status differentials – factors such as the dominance of certain economic sectors, the number of family members who are supported by those who are employed, the opportunity for enterpreneurialism within the public sector, the segregation of income and skill groups through the relative use of space, and the monopolization of meaningful political participation – become the means by which a class structure is established in the socialist societies.

The use of material incentives provides a good example of how this structure is realized in class relations. Again, as in the case of wage and status differentials, the fact that material incentives are permitted and the relative sizes of these incentives are less significant than the meaning that material incentives assume in the context of different class practices. While it is generally understood, in the socialist societies, that an improvement in material conditions

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inspires satisfaction with the social system, material rewards are perceived as operating differently on industrial workers, on the one hand, and on all others, especially administrators and managers, on the other hand. In particular, the new members of the industrial work force are seen as most responsive to and most grateful for their upward social mobility under socialism. This material reward makes even the relatively secure members of the manual working class vulnerable to political manipulation. As Mao said in 1956, "the workers [were] . . . maintaining a "high level of enthusiasm" because prices were "low and stable," life was secure, and in general they enjoyed a higher standard of living than before Liberation."[48] Within the industrial work force, material incentives are varied according to the level of skill: cruder, collectivistic techniques are used to mobilize relatively unskilled, sometimes illiterate workers, but more sophisticated, individualistic means are used to raise the performance level of the more highly skilled workers. The Soviet experience in building up an industrial labor force documents this variation over time. In the 1920s, when a small core of the pre-revolutionary, skilled industrial work force still remained in the factories, the Soviets encouraged a scientific management movement. For Western analysts, Lenin's apparent fascination with Taylorist techniques appears to prove that Lenin either did not want to avoid or could not avoid introducing elements of capitalist structure into socialist society; instead, Lenin may have been elaborating a rational strategy to increase productivity within – not despite – the financial and political constraints of the post-revolutionary period.[49] But by the beginning of the 1930s, with the mass recruitment of peasant workers, the scientific management movement ceded to mass literacy campaigns and sloganeering for teams of shock workers. In the mid-thirties, as the work force as a whole had completed minimal training but had to learn new skills of greater technical complexity, material incentives in the form of wage differentials and piece work were established. A system of examinations in technical competence was also set up.[50] Thus a comprehensive system of material incentives may separate the highly skilled from the less skilled workers. Regardless of the size of the incentives, the system may contribute to the isolation of those who have made their way to highly-skilled status from the rest of the "working class."

However, the incentives given to manual workers, even on the highest skill level, differ fundamentally from the incentives granted to administrative and managerial personnel in terms of their regularity and their purpose. Honoraria such as the "thirteenth month" of bonus pay, which is given normally to Soviet Party administrators and industrial executives, are regular payments.[51] In contrast, the bonuses received by manual workers depend on productivity (and, in turn, on supplies and other factors which are not always

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predictable), so they are highly irregular. In Yugoslavia, where workers' bonuses depend on an enterprise's profit margin, payment is dependent on so many factors outside the workers' immediate control, e.g. placement on the market, money supply, and international competition, that these material incentives are also highly irregular. In the judgment of economist Peter Wiles, none of the material payments which are given to workers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (excluding Yugoslavia) is large enough, immediate enough, or sufficiently related to the individual labor effort to be considered a real incentive. Yet, again according to Wiles, the material rewards which, since the mid-1960s, have been derived from enterprise profits do act to some degree as an incentive on managerial personnel. He says that the managerial bonus in the Soviet Union "really does act like piece work upon its recipients." Because it "is about 20 per cent of salary and is settled quarterly, it remains, of course, a great incentive."[52] Thus the system of material rewards makes managers see bonuses differently than workers do. Even though both managers and workers supposedly receive bonuses for their productivity or for their enterprise's profitability, the payments – regardless of relative size – appear to contribute to different class practices.

Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that managerial incentives under socialism are still qualitatively different from managerial incentives in capitalist society. In capitalist economies, managers derive large material rewards from their innovations, but in socialist societies, managers derive material rewards from performance, which is limited to fulfilling the production target. According to Wiles, "Managerial bonuses have simply redirected effort from output to profit – but only when output has exceeded the plan targets; below that level, profit counts for little." In addition, according to economist Herbert Levine, Soviet managers find themselves in a "game" situation which discourages either an innovative or an exceedingly high performance because present performance causes a rise in future production plans. Furthermore, the potential reward is not commensurate with the effort which must be expended, particularly when the effort made in any one year, which does not yield a profit until later seasons, is not rewarded until much later and possibly never rewarded at all.[53] To the degree that the Yugoslavs have tried to encourage managerial innovation by removing the apparatus of central planning, they have had to tolerate much more social differentiation than they would have preferred. In general, however, material incentives and rewards in the socialist societies appear to define a context for the development of several different class practices. On the one hand, there are high-level political and economic executives whose regular bonuses depend only in the most general way – say, in the case of disastrous wheat harvests or military failure – on performance. On the other hand, there are the workers

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whose bonuses depend on profitability and, to some degree, on individual performance. Within this group, however, the regularity, the circumstances, and the intention of material rewards differentiate between the managers, the highly skilled workers, and the workers of lesser skills. Whether this differentiation actually results in or accompanies the differentiation of class practice requires closer examination.

Perhaps we can use Miroslav Pečujlić's "Sketch of the Structure of Social Consciousness" to indicate some of the content of the class practice which develops over time in a socialist country, in this case, in Yugoslavia. Although Pečujlić delineates more categories than we have and does not speak directly of class or of relations between these groups, his description of the self-concepts and political orientations of the various occupational strata is forthright and relates directly to the differentiation of class practice.[54] Pečujlić describes six separate groups: the unskilled and semi-skilled workers, the highly skilled workers (the "modern working class"), the clerical workers, the higher white-collar workers or administrators, the technocrats, and the executives. These groups represent neither simple occupational strata nor coherent, though possibly complex, social classes. In terms of the present discussion, the least skilled manual workers seem least equivocally to constitute a lower class. There is some confusion about the clerical workers, the highly skilled workers, and the administrators. From the point of view of wages and working conditions, these groups might all be considered as a "working class." However, considering, on the one hand, ideological and political relations, and, on the other hand, their own practices, clerical workers appear related to a lower working class, while highly skilled workers and administrators seem to occupy contradictory class locations, between dominant and subordinate strata. Meanwhile, the technocrats and the executives function in tandem, especially on the local level, but they do not constitute a unified class.

Beneath these groups is the proletarianized majority of the workers, comprised of peasants who commute between small family land-holdings in the countryside and factories, young people who are starting their work careers, and others who remain in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs.[55] Despite the socialist society in which they live, these workers still exhibit the "wage-labor psychology" which is typical of the proletariat in early industrial capitalism. They prefer the economic leveling *(uravnilovka)* of the least democratic, most etatist form of socialism. For Yugoslavs, this is the early post-revolutionary period before the break with Stalin and the Soviet Union. Pečujlić relates this attitude to the relative insecurity of their work and living conditions. Their attitude contrast, for example, with that of the highly-skilled workers, who prefer the system of material incentives which are rewarded for productivity,

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skill, and experience to *uravnilovka* (as long, perhaps, as they enjoy such bonuses). In some ways similar to those proletarians, or, more properly, perhaps, partial proletarians, are the routine clerical workers. Although the clericals have experienced great upward social mobility through both their white-collar employment and their migration to urban-administrative centers, they feel relatively insecure in these positions and seem to prefer the "good old days" when white-collar workers were protected by the extent of the state bureaucratic system. To some degree this insecurity is not well founded. The number of white-collar jobs in Yugoslavia did decrease around 1960 with the dismantling of the central state apparatus, but, from 1960 to 1970, the number of these jobs steadily rose again. Nevertheless, white-collar workers in the "economic" sector enjoy much less job security than those in the government bureaucracy, and there are constant demands for "modernization," that is, upgrading the skill structure through firing the less educated clericals and replacing them with recent, better qualified graduates.[56]

The highly skilled workers have a peculiar relationship with other social groups and with the social system as a whole. Theoretically, they comprise the vanguard and the *raison d'etre* of this social formation; in practical terms, also, they have enjoyed a great portion of the upward social mobility and material benefits of the post-revolutionary era. Indeed, many of the traditional working class, in China as in Yugoslavia, were promoted into managerial and administrative positions after the revolution. Thus the highly skilled workers' ideological and material protection have inspired a high degree of self-identification with the Yugoslav social system, and this group still declares itself as willing participants in and thoughtful critics of the institutions of self-management. Nevertheless, these workers' social relations are fragile. Compared to other groups in the society, these workers tend to perceive less easing of social barriers under socialism. A reason for their possible unease is that, in recent years, they have been edged out of managerial positions and replaced with technical school or college graduates; at the same time, as Vušković points out, they do not hold many seats as workers in the most important legislative and executive organs of government. Furthermore, young highly skilled workers feel the crunch of competition for jobs, the difficulty of moving up in the job hierarchy without seniority, and the decline of opportunities for material and status advancement relative to the expectations fostered by both the post-revolutionary generation's success and the self-management ideology.

A fourth group in Pečujlić's typology is that of the higher administrators. Like the highly skilled workers who, in many cases, have been recruited from the nucleus of the pre-revolutionary working class, this group has been

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formed largely from the families of the pre-war civil service. They seem a self-contained and relatively self-satisfied group. Because they are well educated and entitled to their current positions on a meritocratic basis, they differ from the lower clerical workers who fear job rationalization and thus loss of employment. There is an implication that, while this group has never been completely penetrated by socialist socialization (for example, they probably are either *pro forma* Party members or do not belong at all), the higher administrators have been neutralized politically.

Because of the standard of living and the prestige that they enjoy, and the perceptions they hold of their relative positions in the society, the technocrats and the executives circle warily at the top of the social structure that Pečujlić describes. Just as the highly skilled workers constitute a reference group from below for the technocrats, the political and economic executives of government, Party, and enterprise administrations comprise a reference group from above. Pečujlić believes that the technocrats have made their peace with the politicization of the socialist industrial system, especially since they have been promoted to positions previously held by less qualified appointees. Probably, over time, this is typical of technocrats in socialist societies, including China and the Soviet Union as well as Yugoslavia.[57] Disagreements over policy may erupt from time to time, but the functional necessity of technical experts to the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy's control over funds and positions, lead to mutual accommodation. All the socialist societies have acceded to a professionalization of an executive corps, but they have shown different processes of professionalization. In Yugoslavia, for example, members of the relatively specialized-professionalized group of economic administrators tend to develop careers in one of the organizational hierarchies, e.g. the government *or* the Party. In the Soviet Union, however, the economic administrators shift back and forth between organizational hierarchies, i.e. working now as economic administrators in government and at other times as economic administrators in the Party. Thus it would seem that the Soviet pattern would inhibit the development of competition or special interests among economic personnel in the Party, in the government, in the enterprises, and so on. Also, the Soviets tend to professionalize the field of economic administration by maintaining the stability of the personnel, but the Yugoslavs generally move the administrators from position to position. Either case may create a background for cross-class cooperation or for a coalition between technocrats and bureaucrats.[58] Bernard Chavance, a colleague of Charles Bettelheim, even uses the term "state bourgeoisie" for this group, which he takes to be a single class comprised of different, sometimes sharply contradictory fractions or strata. Although "bourgeoisie" does not seem applicable to this group, and it may not yet constitute a single

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class, Chavance correctly sees the Party leadership, at least in the Soviet Union, as mediating between central bureaucratic groups and local bureaucratic groups, and between bureaucrats and industrial managers.[59] Yugoslav technocrats, and ostensibly also Soviet and Chinese technical experts and professional executives, identify with a path of socialist development which emphasizes "rationality" and skill. At times the political leadership can endorse this orientation. However, the leadership fears that the entrenchment of such criteria might compromise their commitment to egalitarianism. For that reason, as well as for bureaucratic self-preservation, the political leaders often withdraw their support from the technocrats and factory directors and recall, together with the partial proletariat of the least skilled workers, the good old days of etatist controls over the economy.[60]

Contradictions

Although observers have not been reluctant to turn up contradictions in every corner of socialist society, contradictions in class relations under socialism can most simply be related to three structural factors: labor mobilization, mechanisms of exchange, and the role of the state. The significance of this ensemble in determining class relations in characteristic, to some degree, of all societies, but, in the absence of the direct economic coercion of capitalism, it recalls the early pre-capitalist modes of production. Moreover, it is important to remember that it is the combination of these factors which has a decisive effect on class relations: piece work, working for a wage, the existence of a market or a bureaucracy *alone* does not create a class society.

Socialist society is predicated on work rather than on ownership. In this sense, socialism has carried one step further capitalism's revolutionary accomplishment, for, in socialist society, both income and access to benefits depend upon employment.[61] Aside from this structural requirement, the socialist societies have had to rely on various techniques of labor mobilization in order to get people to work. The task is compounded by problems of capital-accumulation in a context bounded, on the one hand, by an international economic system where wealth and might depend on industrial power and, on the other hand, by an indigenous work force which is oriented, especially in the predominant rural sector, toward small-scale, individualistic production. In this situation, labor-intensive work can be encouraged only with withdrawal from the international system. The more frequent response among socialist societies, which are already semi-peripheral to the world economy, is to try to raise individual productivity by developing a panoply of techniques of labor mobilization. These have varied, both over time and between the various socialist societies with the strength and the self-sufficiency of the countries' economic infrastructures.[62]

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But no simple correlations can be made between labor scarcity and a particular technique (e.g. ideological, material, or physical coercion) of labor mobilization. All socialist societies at some point institute forced, or almost forced, labor: the Soviet Union's forced collectivization and labor camps, the Chinese and the Cuban labor brigades (particularly in deploying urban population in rural construction), the voluntary and enthusiastic youth brigades which followed the Yugoslav revolution. Moreover, the public image of the predominance of an ideological, a material, or a physically coercive technique of labor mobilization in certain socialist societies obscures the variety of means which are available. As reported in the *New York Times,* for example (March 28, 1977), "*Jenmin Jih Pao* this week quoted a little used saying of Mao on the point: 'Rewards should be given to labor heroes and model workers.' The paper warned shirkers, this time quoting Lenin, that 'he who does not work shall not eat.'" There does seem to be a logical interrelation between the various means of labor mobilization which can be utilized at any given time. For example, when piece work was introduced in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the trade unions' rights to collective bargaining with factory management were also curtailed. Conversely, material concessions to peasants and workers during the Soviet NEP and the Yugoslav adoption of both workers' self-management and material rewards represent a negation (less permanent in the former case) of ideologically and physically coercive labor mobilization. As such, it suggests an analogy with similar situations in the development of capitalist productive capacities, as when, in periods of industrial expansion amid labor shortage, North American employers did not challenge their factory workers' claims to customary rights of control over aspects of the work process.[63]

The socialist societies contrast most with the capitalist societies in their structural capacity to "incorporate" all workers into the society. They are able to do this not by means of ideological mystification – which loses its power to convince, in any event, after the first flush of nationalization – but largely by granting some degree of workers' control over the work process or the enterprise management (as in Yugoslavia) and also by maintaining a relatively satisfactory standard of living (as, recently and most successfully, in Hungary). It would seem that, to the degree that the workers do not witness direct evidence of their "surplus-product's" lining the pockets of their technical superiors, they do not press for recognition of contradictory class relations, e.g. by making complaints in the various institutionalized channels (Party, trade unions, trade unions' complaint bureaux) open to them; by *ad hoc* organizations other than strikes; by any of the historical forms of collective protest which develop, under capitalism, in the absence of legalized strikes and in the face of strong state counterforce; and, in Yugoslavia, by

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illegal but legitimized work stoppages. In particular, workers in socialist society appear much less disturbed than sympathetic observers by the transformation of the technical division of labor into a social division of labor, as long as the workers see the socialist society as producing benefits, even small ones, for them.[64] Given the economic and political constraints of socialist society, workers accept incentives that workers in a capitalist context would find negative or even mildly coercive. As Wiles succinctly characterizes this difference:

> If material supplies are very uncertain, piece-work becomes a lottery, producing much inequality, but no incentive. If the particular goods we want, or all marginal goods, are unobtainable, money loses its marginal utility and so cannot be an incentive . . . If a monopsonistic employer like the Soviet state reduces our pay in our present job and all the other ones to which we might turn, we will work harder, since the supply curve of total labor slopes backward.[65]

So where are the contradictions? Aside from the basic conflict that we have already noted, between those who give and those who get labor incentives, and the separate class practices which may develop on the basis of such a difference, a contradiction emerges between the need for special protection, on the side of those whose labor is being mobilized, and the structural negation of such special treatment. Whether the social formation has included institutions of workers' control (as in Yugoslavia) or has suppressed workers' and peasants' councils (as in the Soviet Union), socialist society has systematically excluded protectionism of its industrial work force, particularly in the form of trade unionism. Workers are protected as much or as little as all citizens, and this protection is not – except in the most general ideological terms – extended to them *as workers.* As Chavance most critically puts it, "The Soviet working class has been deprived not only of the political power it was the first in the world to conquer, of its autonomous class organization, and of the means of production, but it has also been deprived of its revolutionary ideology.[66]

To the extent that – despite the disavowals of special protection or even the necessity of special protection – some groups of the work force really are protected, e.g. in terms of job security or geographical or career mobility, relative to the more vulnerable position of other labor groups, to that extent a contradiction develops in social relations. Thus the evidence of "class struggle" under socialism should be defined not in terms of differentials in power, privilege, or prestige, but on the basis of the ideological and political negation of such differentiation.[67]

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We can presume that labor mobilization will continue as a source of contradiction despite reforms in the amount of material incentives or in the technical division of labor. Moreover, although labor mobilization in any form of society is, to some degree, necessarily coercive, labor mobilization which is oriented toward economic growth necessitates the constant, large-scale control which exacerbates class struggle. Recent historical studies of the transition from one mode of production to another, particularly the transition from feudalism to capitalism, have indicated the crucial significance in this process of social change of the strengthening of property rights.[68] Although the diffusion of ownership functions in the modern period precludes an exact parallel, mobilizing the labor of both peasants and factory workers in socialist society has also required the strengthening of property rights – in this case, collective rather than individual rights, e.g. through imposing state control over the freedom of movement of both industrial workers and collective farmers, as well as over the disposition of an agricultural and an industrial surplus. Whether these property rights exert control over land or people has an eventual, long-term effect on the mode of production which is created; but in the short run, as in contemporary socialist society, the effect is to intensify a contradiction in social relations.

Like labor mobilization, the market mechanism can represent a consistent, large-scale, not necessarily coercive means of control. However, in this case, control is exercised over exchange between individuals and between collective enterprises. So the market affects relations of both production and distribution. Market mechanisms in a socialist context invariably breed disparity, insecurity, and calculation which, when shared, often engenders collusion. But they do not create class relations where none previously existed. Thus, on the one hand, there is some similarity between the effect of trade on early precapitalist society and the effect of a market on socialist society, as well as, on the other hand, some contrast between the effect of the expansion of the market in early capitalism and the effect of its appearance in socialist society. Indeed, in the context of socialist society, the market appears more as a means of justification of existing or nascent class relations than as a means of allocation. In Yugoslavia, for example, where market socialism is least impeded by planning imperatives and forced redistribution, the market maintains traditional cleavages which had been established in pre-revolutionary society, e.g. between urban and rural areas, and between economically developed and economically underdeveloped republics, and it reinforces those opportunities for socialist entrepreneurialism which had already been created by bureaucratic allocation.[69] Nevertheless, market socialism, as opposed to bureaucratic-etatist socialism, does seem to magnify enterprise expenditure on non-social goods and services, e.g. through expense accounts, advertising,

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and perks, over the amount spent in similar non-productive ways, e.g. through payoffs to the *tolkach* ("expeditor") and bribes like *blat* in the Soviet Union.[70] In this light, it seems quite unnecessary to debate whether surplus-*value* or suplus-*product* is extracted from the workers in socialist society when so much money is *spent as a surplus.* Furthermore, by affecting the benefits available to the poorest groups in the society – who are technically unskilled, politically unconnected, and perceived as ideologically unregenerate, and thus unable to compete for either bureaucratic largesse or market success – the market strengthens existing contradictions between social classes.

However, the informal and frequently illegal market mechanisms which exist for private exchanges of necessary goods and services are utilized to some degree in order to alleviate the inequality which is created by both bureaucratic and public market allocations. While we may deplore the primitive capitalist mentality of the socialist landlord or landlady who manages to get title to two public-sector apartments and then sublets one of them at a rent higher than the combined total, or the employed plumber or mechanic who makes house calls on his or her own after working hours, the payments which are derived in this way do not overturn the class structure. At most, they alleviate problems of inefficient delivery or supply of goods and services, and they place the enterprising craftsman in a contradictory class position. As it is, even in Yugoslavia, the private market sector is much less significant and definitely less extensive than the market which has been established in the public sector. In some sense, also, the efficient working of the private market sector may even reinforce the stability of the less efficient or less productive public market sector. Finally, given our insistence on comparing socialist with pre-capitalist society, it is relevant to emphasize the coexistence under socialism of several re-distributive systems, including parallel market mechanisms of legal, semi-legal, and illegal varieties, as well as some form of planning mechanism. No single, uniform market or market-substitute has yet been imposed, as it was during the development of the capitalist mode of production.[71]

Far from having a clear correlation with the kind of class relations which are familiar from capitalist society, market mechanisms in socialist society seem to have an ambiguous effect: both fostering inequalities of their own and redressing the inequalities established by politically-induced redistribution. In contrast to Zygmunt Bauman's observation about the contradiction between the equality fostered by the bureaucratic sector of socialist society and the inequality fostered by the private market sector, Ivan Szelenyi finds that the inequality fostered by the public sector is somewhat alleviated through a system of private market exchanges.[72] At any rate, the overlay of market

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mechanisms on bureaucratic allocation seems to reinforce existing disparities in collective resources, i.e. those of enterprises and regions, and the relations which grow on the basis of these disparities. Finally, although the results of market competition may be transient, the continued use of market mechanisms leads to a permanent justification of contradictions in class relations.

The role of the state in socialist society represents the source of a third contradiction in social relations, but the analysis of this factor is more complicated than the positions of those who hold *a priori* – from "evidence" in Lenin's pre-revolutionary writings, or the existence of the Gulag Archipelago, or the perception of the Party-state bureaucracy as another bourgeoisie – that the state in socialist society creates its own class. In socialist society, the state becomes both the guarantor and the holder of property rights; the state forces more equitable redistribution and oversees the extraction of that surplus which is re-distributed. Moreover, while the state controls access to power and privileges, perhaps the most significant perquisite for those who rise within state organs is the possibility of *circumventing* state-imposed hierarchies.

Similarly, the relations between the Party-state bureaucracy and the rest of the population are not clearly "class relations." People call the bureaucracy a class – indeed, they call it a socialist bourgeoisie – because it exercises collective control over the society's capital and deploys the work force.[73] But, again, the parallel between the political bureaucracy of socialist society and those functional groups in pre-capitalist society which control both land and people, sometimes with ideological justification by the state, suggests that the analogy with the capitalist bourgeoisie is too narrow. Two additional points demonstrate that the understanding of the socialist bureaucracy is insufficient. First, the bureaucracy's social power is no more absolute over workers *as workers* than over any other part of the society; indeed, in some situations the bureaucracy has less leeway to manipulate workers than other, more traditionally oppressed social classes, such as the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie.[74] This indicates that the bureaucracy is more a status group than a separate class, such as the bourgeoisie, which acts in a contradictory tandem with the working class.[75] The second point is that the bureaucracy's control over capital does not redound to its own account, except insofar as it reinforces the bureaucracy's functional indispensability. Moreover, the bureaucracy's ideological relation with other groups in the society is peculiar. The socialist bureaucracy is not ideologically dominant, but it controls the dominant ideology.

In terms of the more subjective elements of class practice, the socialist bu-

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reaucracy appears most unlike a bourgeoisie, for it lacks a distinct class culture. Certainly, in the chronicles of critical observers from Milovan Djilas to Ivan Voinovich,[76] the socialist bureaucracy appears in a full panoply of behavioral characteristics, but these may be the characteristics of a status or occupational group rather than a proof of class culture. If the bureaucracy has a specific ideology at all, it is self-abnegating: this is the asceticism that the bureaucracy, despite a relatively high standard of consumption, bears throughout the post-revolutionary period. Although the bureaucracy's ascetic code may be compared to the early bourgeoisie's Protestant Ethic, socialist asceticism does not represent an ideological appropriation by or for a single social group. In the ensemble of its relations with other groups in the society, the socialist bureaucracy appears to be in a contradictory position, where it is both dominant and subordinate. In ideological relations, it is functionally dominant in controlling the formulation and the manipulation of ideology, yet it remains subordinate to the "proletariat" (i.e. the highly-skilled workers) in the content of that ideology. Politically, it is sometimes a dominant, sometimes a mediating force. Economically, it cooperates and also competes with the technocracy, while it directs, mobilizes, and inspires the work of the whole population: yet it is not legally entitled to appropriate wealth for itself.

This ambiguous position indicates another parallel between the socialist societies of the Second World and the more-or-less socialist societies of the Third World, for the African professor Issa Shivji has described the similar situation of the Tanzanian state bureaucracy as that of a petty bourgeoisie.[77] While it seems premature to link the socialist bureaucracy with any particular social class as it exists in another mode of production, it is relevant to acknowledge the ambiguity of the bureaucracy's relations with other groups in the society, its position of both domination and subordination, and its apparent failure, at least so far, to develop a distinct class practice. Its heterogeneous social origins, with connections in early life to the petty bourgeoisie, in both socialist and Third World societies, its relations of domination and subordination, and the frequent narrowness of its vision do suggest connections with a classical capitalist petty bourgeoisie. This analogy indicates that a fruitful line of analysis of class in socialist society – albeit one which will overturn the dominant paradigms both orthodox and heterodox – should focus on the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. By the same token, the bureaucracy's functional differentiation from the rest of the society, and the rewards that it enjoys for this, indicate an analogy with the elites of early pre-capitalist modes of production.[78]

An objection to this discussion would no doubt be raised by those critics of

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socialist society, especially as represented by the Soviet Union, who are so appalled by the state's use of the secret police and forced-labor camps that they define all contradictions in socialist society in terms of these relations. André Glucksmann, for example, emphasizes the determinacy of this mode of exploitation – "LA TERREUR! [sic] . . . Terror as a relation of production" – over any mere mode of production in socialist society.[79] For Glucksmann, this terror is analogous to the coercion exercised in capitalist society by the classical bourgeoisie, especially in its control over the workers through its use in the nineteenth century of police and military troops. But this analogy is too narrow. First, it situates Glucksmann's analysis, despite all the drama of its tragic content and its political import, among those burgo-centric attempts to cast the socialist bureaucracy in the role of the classical bourgeoisie. Thus, if the mode of exploitation approach were applied to an examination of class in socialist society, it would imply a functionalist rather than a structural analysis. Moreover, focusing attention on a specific mode of exploitation recalls not only capitalist, but also pre-capitalist, society. As we have already pointed out, the creation of any mode of production involves coercion in the strengthening of property rights, over persons as well as over land. Finally, the mode of exploitation approach obscures the dynamic of how the choice of certain strategies – of a certain economic rationality, as Godelier would say – excludes possible alternatives and engenders unanticipated consequences. While terror or even TERROR is practiced together with material incentives and politically-induced redistribution, its consequences for class relations can be neither unambiguous nor completely predictable.

For a Broader Framework

The level of discussion that I have chosen is not without pitfalls. I have aimed between an upper level of generality – particularly, the question of whether we can yet identify a socialist mode of production – and a lower level of specific facts. While I have avoided the arid vocabulary of the upper level and the varied data of polymorphous stratification of the lower level, the discussion may nonetheless have seemed both too general and too concrete. However, by focusing on the structure, contradictions, and practice of social relations in socialist society, I have tried to make a Marxist analysis of the problem of social class under socialism which would broaden both the existing Marxist and non-Marxist frameworks so that socialist society would appear neither "classless," nor "convergent," nor "state-capitalist." In particular, I have objected to those burgo-centric analyses which describe class relations in socialist society in terms of only one factor – the bureaucracy – which, through its control over the collective capital of socialist society, is seen as a functional equivalent of the classical bourgeoisie. In place of that model I

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have offered three general observations: first, "orthodox" Marxist analyses which focus on the proletariat, as well as "revisionist" Marxist analyses and non-Marxist analyses which focus on the state bureaucracy, must be broadened to include discussion of the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the heterogeneous lower class of unskilled manual and routine clerical workers. Second, political, ideological, and economic relations in socialist society combine to create classes which are more ambiguous – in their orientation toward domination or subordination – and more muted than in capitalist society. Third, the salience of extra-economic factors to class relations under socialism invokes a broader comparability between socialist society and early pre-capitalist society, than between socialist and capitalist society.

Nevertheless, it is inevitable that there will be aspects of class relations under socialism which compare with capitalist class relations – and not merely because of latent vestiges of capitalism which have not been completely eradicated. One reason for this continuing analogy with contemporary capitalist society is the simulatneous synchronic and diachronic reality of socialism as both a response to capitalist society and a social formation with its own trajectory. Another reason concerns the conscious and unconscious imitation of dominant social forms by groups which aspire to dominant positions. In this case, socialist societies could not help but imitate in some ways the capitalist forms which dominate the contemporary world system, especially as they become more integrated – even competitively – into the core of this system.[80] A third reason for the appearance of "capitalist" elements in socialist class relations simply relates to the ongoing dynamics, particularly the unintended consequences, of various strategies – and combinations of strategies – of social change.[81] Moreover, there seem to be contradictions peculiar to socialist society, such as the ideological negation of the necessity of special protection for certain categories of the population, which reproduce class relations by institutionalizing conflicts created by the very structure of the society, e.g. in labor mobilization and the role of the state. Exchange mechanisms, like trade in early pre-capitalist society, seem to exacerbate, deepen, and justify these conflicts, although, in some ways, they also seem to redress the imbalances created by the other sources of class relations.

Yet I have argued for recognizing the ambivalence of socialist class relations. We should not assume that functional groups which, in a capitalist context, take on the manifold trappings of social class have the same meaning – or, an even more pernicious significance – in socialist society. Among such groups, the highly skilled workers, the Party-state bureaucracy, the intellectuals in leading administrative positions, and the managers of economic institutions[82] seem particularly vulnerable to both manipulating and being mani-

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pulated in terms of the combination of political, ideological, and economic relations.

There remain at least several unanswered questions about the problem of social class under socialism, some of which, as I have noted, I have reserved for future essays. For example, are the class relations that we find in the revolutionary socialist societies similar to those which would develop in various core countries if they attempted to create a socialist structure? Obviously, the attention that we have drawn to infrastructural constraints on post-revolutionary socialist transformation suggests that there would be significant differences. Do market mechanisms, in contrast to centralized planning, ease contradictions which emerge in inequality? Can political relations of workers' self-management, as in Yugoslavia, succeed in fully integrating a lower class into the society? Or in a country like China, which stresses revolutionary activism, is such behavior on the part of lower-class youth a compensatory mechanism in the absence of culturally-endowed skills, or is it mere opportunism, or is it developed in common with children of the upper class?

Finally, observers of socialist society must question the sources of their own assumptions about what the class nature of socialist society should be. In the first phase of the revolutionary socialist movement, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, people envisioned ideal revolutionary relations on the model of the small independent proprietor. In the second period of this movement, in the third and fourth quarters of the nineteenth century, the model for post-revolutionary social relations was cast in terms of enormous collectivities like social class, especially that of the proletariat. Such images must affect a contemporary judgment about the content of class relations in real socialist societies.

NOTES

1. The empiricists include David Lane, *The Socialist Industrial State* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976); Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (New York: Walker, 1972); and Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (New York: Praeger, 1971); on the principle of "class structuration," see Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
2. In the larger work on socialist societies to which this piece belongs, a prior chapter will examine various theories of social class under socialism. There will be no discussion of whether the self-declared socialist societies are "really" socialist societies.
3. *Cf.* Bertell Ollman, "Marx's Use of 'Class,'" *American Journal of Sociology* 73 (1968): 573–80, and Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, tr. Sheila Patterson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 5.

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4. *Cf.* Alvin W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review* 49 (1955), pp. 496–507.
5. Central to this re-conceptualization of pre-capitalist society is an acknowledgement of the role of coercion in extracting a surplus and in utilizing that surplus to perpetuate the social relations which surround its extraction. Furthermore, it appears that the transition from a simple surplus to an exploitative surplus in early pre-capitalist societies is accompanied by the establishment of a coercive state apparatus, a legitimizing ideology, and class relations as well as class consciousness. See Emmanuel Terray, "Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman," pp. 85–136 in *Marxist Analyses and Social Anthropology,* ed. Maurice Block (London: Malaby Press, 1975); Maurice Godelier, "Essai de bilan critique," in *Horizon, Trajet marxiste en anthropologie* (Paris: Maspero, 1973); and K. P. Moseley and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Pre-capitalist Societies" *Annual Review of Sociology* (Palo Alto, 1978). Cf. Marvin Harris, *Cannibals and Kings* (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 69–82.
6. The core-periphery distinction is, of course, from Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); here it permits us to emphasize the co-existence of different modes of production within the same world system, especially with a capitalist core and a non-capitalist periphery.
7. *Cf.* the statement of Paul Sweezy: "Nor must we assume that in the Soviet Union the base exercises the same sweeping dominance over the superstructure as we find in the advanced capitalist societies – instead, we must entertain the possibility that in this form of society the superstructure, and in particular the ideological factor, has regained some of the relative potency characteristic of pre-capitalist social formations." "Replies [to Bernard Chavance]," *Monthly Review* 29, 1 (May 1977), p. 18. On the formation of "partial" classes, in contrast to classically capitalist social classes, in non-capitalist societies, *cf.* the remarks of Immanuel Wallerstein to a MARHO meeting in New York in Spring 1977.
8. This is what makes a project like Charles Bettelheim's multi-volume work on class struggles in the Soviet Union so exciting. Having said that, I must admit that a short essay such as this will unavoidably shortchange the need for combining synchronic and diachronic analysis, as we skip between parallels with pre-capitalist and late capitalist society.
9. Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes,* tr. Timothy O'Hagan (London: NLB, 1973), p. 63. Italics in original.
10. Note that a sloppy analogy between Soviet and Chinese bureaucratic practices and the Asiatic mode of production parallels earlier Western conceptualization (largely fallacious) of Eastern social formations in terms of the distinctively oppressive, "mysterious" East. See Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: NLB, 1974), pp. 462–95.
11. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes,* p. 86. Note that class struggle is not necessarily expressed the same way in all forms of society, given the different political, ideological, legal, and economic constraints on its expression. Strikes, for example, evidence only one form of class struggle in a particular social formation.
12. *Cf.* Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes,* pp. 62ff, 82; on class practice, see Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,* tr. David Fernbach (London: NLB, 1975), pp. 16–17.
13. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," *New Left Review* 95 (January–February 1976), p. 82.
14. Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 169.
15. However, institutional and ideological transfers between core and periphery of the socialist system do not run in only one direction. Such mutual influences will be explored in a later essay.

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16. This would seem to be the assumption of Samir Amin and others, whose class analysis of Third World societies flows from an understanding of imperialistic core-periphery relations, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis," *Theory and Society* 3, 4 (1976), pp. 461–83.
17. See Theda Skocpol, "Old Regime Legacies and Communist Revolutions in Russia and China," *Social Forces* 55 (1976), pp. 284–315.
18. See Charles Bettelheim, *Les Luttes de classes en URSS, 1923–1930,* v. 2 (Paris: Maspero/Seuil, 1977); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965 [1950]); Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 1 and 8. *Cf.* Maurice Godelier on the unintended vs. the intended rationality of all economic systems, *Rationality and Irrationality in Economics,* tr. Brian Pearce (London: NLB, 1972), pp. 306ff.
19. There may be ambivalent reaction to this period among non-ruling segments of the population, e.g. middle and rich peasants, who, on the one hand, were not pro-revolutionary but who, on the other hand, as in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, did not immediately suffer deprivation or demotion after the revolution. Moore, *Soviet Politics,* p. 244. See, on Yugoslavia, for example, Miroslav Pečujlić, *Horizonti revolucije* [Revolutionary horizons] (Belgrade: Institut za političke studije FPN, 1970), pp. 312 ff., 351, and Vojin Milić, "Osvrt na društvenu pokretljivost u Jugoslaviji" [A review of social mobility in Yugoslavia], *Statistička revija* 10, 3–4 (1960), pp. 184–235.
20. Pečujlić, *Horizonti revolucije,* p. 310; Miroslav Živković, "Dominacija mediokritetstva u našoji društvenoj eliti" [The dominance of mediocrity in our social elite], *Gledišta* 9 (1968), pp. 1017–24.
21. Boris Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," *New Left Review* 95 (January–February 1976), p. 38; Martin King Whyte, "Inequality and Stratification in the People's Republic of China," *China Quarterly* 64 (December 1975), p. 707; Peter Wiles, "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," *Survey* 21, 3 (1975), p. 36.
22. See, e.g., Milovan Djilas, *Anatomy of a Moral,* ed. Abraham Rothberg (New York: Praeger, 1959) and Matija Bećković, "O Našim Sestrama" [On our sisters], in *Dr. Janez Paćuka o medjuvremenu* (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1969).
23. Positions in the Party administration seem to offer to manual workers a direct line into non-manual work and to people who are already in administrative positions an opportunity to jump over their first career hurdle. Sharon Zukin, "Professionalization, Ethnicity, and the Common Interest Among Soviet and Yugoslav Economic Decision-Makers," Unpublished paper, Columbia University, 1969.
24. There is, of course, an ideology which legitimates the dominance of this functional group, e.g. that of the Leninist party, but this is not the same as a class ideology. There will be a fuller discussion, below, of the Party-state bureaucracy.
25. Godelier, "Essai de bilan critique," pp. 152–4.
26. *Viz.* David Lane's topic of "the socialist industrial state" and Anthony Giddens' discussion of "class structure of the advanced societies" (capitalist as well as socialist).
27. *Cf.* Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History* (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
28. Moore, *Soviet Politics,* ch. 8, 10, 13; Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); Grant Hildebrand, *Designing for Industry: The Architecture of Albert Kahn* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974); Samuel Lieberstein, "Technology, Work, and Sociology in the USSR: The NOT Movement," *Technology and Culture* 16, 1 (1975), pp. 48–66.
29. See Moshe Lewin, "L'Etat et les classes sociales en URSS 1929–1933," *Actes de la Recherche en sciences sociales* 1 (1976), pp. 2–31.
30. Moore, *Soviet Politics,* p. 176.

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31. *Cf.* Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. ch. 9; and Bettelheim, *Luttes de classes en URSS,* v. 1–2, whose interpretation of early Soviet, e.g. NEP, and Chinese, i.e. Maoist, experience in terms of constructing socialism on a peasant base offers a rapprochement with Third World structure.
32. Perhaps, in the future, this fallacy will be compared to the problem of interpreting the sixteenth-century rise of absolutism in Western and Eastern Europe in relation to the elimination and the strengthening respectively, of serfdom. At present, social historians are showing that industrialization even in one country leads to contradictory developments which had previously been ignored by a unitary rubric, e.g. the family's response to industrialization in terms of both increased dependence and increased autonomy, which used to be studied only as autonomy.
33. See, for example, Pavel Mahonin, "Socijalna struktura čehoslovačkog društva" [Social structure of Czechoslovak society], *Sociologija* 8 (1966), pp. 107–24 and Wlodzimierz Weselowski, "Preobražaj klasne strukture u socijalističkom društvu" [A model of class structure in socialist society], ibid., pp. 87–106.
34. *Cf.* Erik Olin Wright's emendation of Poulantzas, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," *New Left Review* 98 (July–August 1976), pp. 3–42.
35. Here we are not trying to enumerate how many classes exist in socialist society or to place people within a set locus of class relations. Rather, the intention is to show how the concepts of upper class and lower class – as well as that of class itself – have to be adapted to fit socialist society, and also to show how ambiguous some of these concepts must necessarily become.
36. In the Soviet Union, most marriages take place between partners of the same class, occupation, and educational background. The only major exception is provided by marriages between working-class husbands and lower white-collar wives. In Yugoslavia, there is a tendency toward concentration of rural landholdings (despite a legal maximum) in the hands of the largest owners, who buy up the small properties of relatively poor peasants, especially those who must seek full-time factory work. Wesley Fisher, "The Soviet Mariage Market," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1976, ch. 6; Vladimir Milić, "Osobenosti promena u socijalnoj strukturi socijalističkog samoupravnog društva" [Characteristics of the change in social structure of socialist, self-managing society], *Sociologija* 18 (1976), p. 44.
37. Bettelheim, *Luttes de classes en URSS,* v. 2, p. 242.
38. See L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, "Some Problems of the Social Structure of the Soviet Working Class," in Murray Yanowitch and Wesley A. Fisher, eds., *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973), pp. 27–46.
39. Bettelheim, *Luttes de classes en URSS,* v. 2, p. 539; *cf.* the contradictory class location of the "middle layers" in capitalist society, e.g. Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), ch. 18.
40. See Fisher's work on marriage patterns in the Soviet Union (note 36), the high proportion of secondary school failures in Yugoslavia who come from working class and peasant families (Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," pp. 38–9); movies of lower white-collar and industrial worker milieux, made in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, such as the Yugoslav "Man is not a Bird" and the Czech "Loves of a Blonde"; similar observations of American visitors to secondary schools and colleges in Cuba; and Whyte, on China: ". . . At the same time access to leadership positions, Party and Youth League membership and possibly also to marriage mates has been more difficult for offspring of urban bad classes [i.e. the poor], and in recent years the ability of these children to get ahead by way of the educational ladder has been sharply limited by student enrollment reforms" ("Inequality and Stratification in the PRC," p. 705).

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41. There is increasingly good documentation of the elite's standard of living, e.g. Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite," *Survey* 21, 3 (1975), pp. 1–27, and a critical discussion of the relative significance of different types of differentials in Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," but Simon Leys's anti-radical-chic report of extremes of social differentiation in China illustrates rather sharply the difficulties inherent in presenting differentials without a systematic understanding of either socialist context or structure: *Chinese Shadows* (New York: Viking, 1977).
42. "My own feeling," writes economist Peter Wiles, "is that chance plays a very large part in all wage relativities everywhere, and that these divergences [between countries] should not surprise us." "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," pp. 34–5; on randomness in post-revolutionary upward social mobility, see also Eugene A. Hammel, *The Pink Yo-yo* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1969). Wiles also points out the effect of market forces, i.e. the supply of labor relative to demand, on lowering the salaries of white-collar workers and engineers, in relation to the wages of other occupational groups, between 1932 and 1960 in the Soviet Union (pp. 30–1). Vušković notes that wage differentials in any one enterprise or any branch of the economy are rather small, tending to an average and a mean of 1:4 ("Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," p. 31). Indeed, I can recall an article in the Yugoslav press in 1971 which, referring to these figures, was entitled "Equality Even Greater than China's." In addition, scholars such as Moore and Bettelheim, as well as leaders like Lenin and Mao, conclude that even in socialist society some differentiation in material rewards is objectively necessary in order to mobilize people to work.
43. Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," p. 33.
44. Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," pp. 33–4; *cf.* Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito,* pp. 109–14, and Bettelheim, *Luttes de classes en URSS,* v. 2, pp. 256–7, 529.
45. Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," pp. 35–6.
46. See G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi, "Sociological Aspects of the Allocation of Housing," pp. 375–400 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life* (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1971); *cf.* Yugoslav articles on "wild settlements" (similar to squatter towns), e.g. Miroslaw Živković, "Jedan primer segregacije u razvoju naših gradova" [An example of segregation in the development of our cities], *Sociologija* 10, 3 (1968), pp. 37–58. Leys even speaks of the isolation of bureaucrats from other social groups in the May Seventh camps in China: ostensibly, these camps are forced retreats for socialist re-education, but Leys believes that the bureaucrats use them as a sort of exclusive vacation club *(Chinese Shadows).*
47. Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," pp. 39–41; Barbara A. Anderson, "Social Stratification in the Soviet Union: Equality, Excellence, and Other Issues," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 8 (1975), pp. 397–412; Zukin, "Professionalization, Ethnicity, and the Common Interest Among Soviet and Yugoslav Economic Decision-Makers"; "Diskusija: Društveno-politička angažovanje omladine" [Discussion: The Socio-political involvement of young people], *Gledista* 18, 1–2 (1977), pp. 21–4, 53–4.
48. Stuart R. Schram, "Introduction," in Schram, ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China* (Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 43; see also Pečujlić, *Horizonti revolucije,* p. 340, and David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, *Soviet Industrial Workers* (London: Martin Robertson, 1978). *Cf.* The Polish idea, from the mid-1960s, that workers could be "compensated" with higher salaries for a loss of potential political power and social status, or with a high status ascribed to being a worker, for economic and political losses. The class relations which are built on this basis are tenuous, *viz.* food riots in working-class areas toppled the Gomulka regime and have threatened Gierek, too.

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49. As Peter Green points out in a recent article on Poland, the necessity of increasing productivity in conditions of labor shortage usually generates a choice between three tactics: speeding up the work process, lengthening the working day, and rapidly developing or importing new productive technology. In the impoverished, isolated, pro-proletariat Soviet Union of the mid-twenties, as well as in Poland of the 1970s, the leaders' optimum choice is a more "scientific" management of labor. This is also explained in Kendall Bailes's assessment of Alexei Gastev, the founder of the Central Labor Institute and a popularizer of scientific management notions: "By 1924 . . . he had articulated for Soviet society a work ethic which justified sacrificing the present to the future, the consumer to the producer, and the individual to the work collective. It is not surprising that his ideology and his approach to vocational training, which stressed the intensification of labor, should prove attractive to Soviet industrial mangers in a labor-rich, capital-poor country." Peter Green, "The Third Round in Poland," *New Left Review* 101–102 (February–April 1977), p. 92; Kendall E. Bailes, "Alexei Gastev and the Soviet Controversy over Taylorism, 1918–24," *Soviet Studies* 29 (1977), pp. 373–94.
50. Lieberstein, "Technology, Work, and Sociology in the USSR," pp. 55–8.
51. Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR," pp. 14–15 and ff.
52. Wiles, "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," pp. 38–40. While Wiles believes that material incentives based on industrial performance have been declining in importance since Stalin's time, Matthews' respondents' accounts of the material rewards for high-level political and economic executives suggest no such diminution.
53. Wiles, "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," p. 40; Herbert Levine, "Economic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy," Columbia University Seminar on Communism, March 9, 1977.
54. The discussion generally relies on this Pečujlić essay, in *Horizonti revolucije,* esp. pp. 301–16, 333–57, but the comparisons are ours. Note that Pečujlić omits the peasants from his typology. While the peasantry is a declining social class in Yugoslavia, this omission is typical of the industrialist consensus of the socialist industrial societies.
55. Soviet sociologists Z. I. Monich et al., "The Working Class in the Structure of the Rural Population" [Part II], *Soviet Sociology* 15, 3 (Winter 1976–7), pp. 18–9, describe the rural industrial work force in general as heterogeneous, unstable, and unskilled, relative to other groups in the population, and including, besides the groups we have already mentioned, recruits from among more skilled workers, white collar workers, and housewives who are seasonally employed in factories.
56. Milić, "Osobenosti promena u socijalnoj strukturi socijalističkog društva," p. 59.
57. This is not a painless process, Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics;* Kendall E. Bailes, "The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking," *American Historical Review* 79 (1974), pp. 445–69; Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), ch. 4; Stephen Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning and Management, 1949 to the Present* (New York Pantheon, 1977).
58. Zukin, "Professionalization, Ethnicity, and the Common Interest Among Soviet and Yugoslav Economic Decision-Makers."
59. Bernard Chavance, "On the Relations of Production in the USSR," *Monthly Review* 29, 1 (May 1977), pp. 10–11.
60. *Cf.* Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito,* pp. 138–51.
61. *Cf.* C. B. Macpherson, *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 154; and Charles Reich, who finds that status rights, and benefits in American society are contingent on certain "loyal" behavior to the polity, and so calls American social structure "the new feudalism." "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal* 73 (1964), pp. 768, 785.

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62. Skocpol, "Old Regime Legacies"; G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, "Compliance Succession in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," pp. 410–38 in *A Sociological Reader in Complex Organization,* ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinchart and Winston, 1969, 2nd ed.); Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution;* Lieberstein, "Technology Work, and Sociology in the USSR."
63. Lieberstein, "Technology, Work, and Sociology in the USSR," p. 57; Bryan Palmer, "Workers' Control and Managerial Innovation: A North American Perspective, 1860–1922," Paper delivered at MARHO Conference on History and Culture, New York, April 1977; *cf.* the variety of techniques of labor mobilization utilized by the aristocracy in Western Europe when feudal obligations were insufficient or ineffective in mobilizing labor, North and Thomas, *Rise of the Western World.*
64. Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito;* Lane and O'Dell, *Soviet Industrial Workers.*
65. Wiles, "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," p. 40.
66. Chavance, "Relations of Production in the USSR," p. 12; *cf.* Sharon Zukin, "Labor Unions and Self-Management," Paper delivered at the Second International Conference on Participation, Workers' Control and Self-Management (Paris, September 1977); and E. K. Hunt's negative comments on the view that The Soviet workers are erupting in protest, in "Socialism and the Nature of Soviet Society," *Socialist Revolution* 32 (March–April 1977), pp. 143–60.
67. This point will be developed in a future essay.
68. North and Thomas, *Rise of the Western World;* Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State.*
69. Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito,* ch. 8; Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," pp. 42–3; Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "The Yugoslav Economy in the 1970s," Paper presented at Conference on Yugoslavia: Accomplishments and Problems, Washington, D.C., October 1977; Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (p. 137), on the distinction, in Warsaw, between the "proletariat" and the "Chevroletariat"; in Belgrade, with market socialism, came the rise of the "Peugeoisie." *Cf.* Zygmunt Bauman, "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in Socialist Society," pp. 129–48 in *The Social Analysis of Class Structure,* ed. Frank Parkin (London: Tavistock, 1974).
70. "[In the region around Split, Yugoslavia, in 1971]twenty million dinars was spent on propaganda and advertising (or five times what was spent on children's homes, twenty times what was spent on the old and disabled, twice what was spent on *all* forms of social security)." If this allocation bends the parameters of socialist society, what of illegal payments in the non-market socialist societies? According to Matthews, "It is arguable that the Soviet elite *must* frequently break the law to insure its own material well-being." Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," p. 34; Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR," p. 22.
71. See A. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* 29 (1977), pp. 62–85. As Josip Županov, the father of industrial sociology in Yugoslavia, has pointed out, the market is only incipient in Yugoslavia, it is not yet a fully developed structure. "Neke dileme u vezi s robno-novčanim odnosima" [Some dilemmas in connection with commodity relations], *Praxis* 5, 1–2 (1968), p. 165: see also Vušković, "Social Inequality in Yugoslavia," p. 30, and the popular Yugoslav play, "Razdvojni put Bore Šnajdera," a comedy which recounts the successes of a moonlighting workman.
72. See notes 69 and 46.
73. This issue is discussed in more detail in the essay on theories of social class under socialism.
74. *Cf.* Lane and O'Dell, *Soviet Industrial Workers;* Wiles, "Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution," p. 39.
75. And what of the bureaucracy in those socialist societies which, like China, choose to encourage the agrarian sector and the peasantry?

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76. E. G. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York: Praeger, 1957); Vladimir Voinovich, *The Ivankiad,* tr. David Lapeza (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977).
77. Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), pt. 3.
78. Paul Sweezy, "Bettelheim on Revolution From Above: The USSR in the 1920s," *Monthly Review* 29, 5 (October 1977) p. 17.
79. André Glucksmann, *La Cuisinière et le mangeur d'hommes* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p. 127.
80. *Cf.* Sharon Zukin, "Mimesis in the Origins of Bourgeois Culture," *Theory and Society* 4, 3 (1977), pp. 333–58; André Gunder Frank, "Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor," *Review* 1, 1 (1977), pp. 91–140.
81. Again, see Moore, *Soviet Politics;* Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality;* Bettelheim, *Luttes de classes en URSS.*
82. On factory management's ambivalence, see Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution,* p. 132.

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